Will Netanyahu never learn?

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor at POLITICO Europe.

Is it possible Winston Churchill might have approved of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arming criminal militia-cum-clans opposed to Hamas in Gaza?

After all, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

On the eve of Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, Britain’s iconic wartime leader apparently told an aide he was ready to make common cause with longtime Bolshevik foe Joseph Stalin. “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons,” he supposedly quipped. Similarly, there’s certainly no love lost between Hamas — the militant paramilitary group responsible for the savage Oct. 7 attacks on Israel — and the gunmen of Rafah-native Yasser Abu Shabab.

However, this approach can have its drawbacks and lead to devastating consequences, as we’ve seen in recent history: The U.S. pairing with the likes of Osama bin Laden didn’t work out so well in the end — although it was useful in humbling the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The shortcomings of this tactic — frequently adopted by Egypt in Gaza before 1967 and by Israel ever since — has also been evident in the tactical short-term embraces of secular Palestinian nationalists, the Muslim Brotherhood, Fedayeen insurgents, and an assortment of other factions, only for everything to eventually unravel.

After Oct. 7, when Hamas murderously rampaged across southern Israel, killing 1,195 and abducting 240 hostages, Netanyahu came under justified ire from politicians and citizens alike. Prior to the barbaric attacks, he had been a leading advocate of boosting the Islamist militant group in Gaza in a risky game of “divide-and-rule” — one that played the militants of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar off against the Palestine Liberation Organization and Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

To this end, from the late 2010s to the early 2020s, he encouraged Qatar to channel hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas, even telling a conference of Likud lawmakers in 2019 that “anyone who wants to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state needs to support strengthening Hamas.”

In fairness, the Israeli leader wasn’t alone in thinking Hamas could be exploited as a useful strategic asset, and that over time, the group would moderate and become more focused on governing their mini-state than on insurgency. Then, with Palestinians hopelessly divided between Hamas and the PLO, Israel could throw its hands up and insist it had no real negotiating partner, all while expanding settlements in the West Bank and avoiding any progress on a two-state solution.

Many others in Israel’s political and defense establishment were sold on the tactic too. “Senior politicians from across the political spectrum — including Naftali Bennett, Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid — bought into the idea, and it was also promoted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF),” Michael Milshtein, a Tel Aviv University academic and former head of the Palestinian division of Israeli military intelligence, told Unpacked last year. Even Netanyahu’s messianic far-right Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich bought into the ploy, saying in 2015: “The Palestinian Authority is a burden, and Hamas is an asset.”

But the tactic’s apparent success arguably lulled both Netanyahu and Israel’s defense establishment into badly misreading the signs in the run-up to Oct. 7, and to blunder into a colossal intelligence failure. Warnings issued by the tatzpitaniyot — the mainly female border lookouts — were ignored, their reports of unusual activity and staged attack rehearsals dismissed, as their intelligence didn’t fit the prevailing narrative: that there was nothing to fear from Hamas.

And now, despite the fact that boosting Hamas contributed to the disaster, Netanyahu has been obliged to admit he’s “activated” some anti-Hamas Palestinian clans in Gaza — many of them notorious for drug smuggling and crime — on the grounds that they could undertake missions, thereby saving the lives of Israeli soldiers.

Netanyahu’s somewhat forced admission to the fact came after one of his political critics, right-wing lawmaker and former Deputy Prime Minister Avigdor Lieberman, tipped Israeli media off that the Israeli intelligence has been arming some Palestinian factions in Gaza. Lieberman warned the tactic could backfire — that the light arms and assault rifles supplied to clan factions could eventually be turned on Israelis — much as Qatari cash helped fund Oct. 7.

Reportedly, among these groups is Abu Shabab’s Popular Forces, now claiming its helping guard the new Israeli-sponsored food distribution hubs run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation — a private U.S. contractor Israel has earmarked to replace U.N. aid distribution. In a statement to media, the group said it’s helping “ensure that the food and medicine reaches its beneficiaries” and secure the hubs’ surroundings. And according to Abu Shabab himself, who claims to be acting “under Palestinian legitimacy,” the militia intends to protect civilians from “aid thieves,” as well as “the terror of the de facto Hamas government.”

Meanwhile, U.N. officials like Jonathan Whittall of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs allege that Abu Shabab’s fighters have been involved in looting U.N. aid in areas controlled by the Israeli military. And he’s fuming about the groups designation as “protectors of the goods being distributed through Israel’s new militarized hubs.”

But what could possibly go wrong with putting a fox in the henhouse?

According to Lieberman, a lot. The lawmaker claimed some of the “criminals and felons” being armed by the IDF are “identified with the Islamic State” — although he hasn’t offered evidence to substantiate this incendiary charge. Nonetheless, the individuals Netanyahu is turning to are hardly a savory bunch. Abu Shabab himself was imprisoned by Hamas for alleged drug trafficking, and it’s unclear whether he was released when Israel launched its military campaign after Oct. 7, or if he escaped from jail.

However, senior Israeli security officials told national media that Abu Shabab’s group is just the most prominent among several armed factions receiving Israeli support, as the strategy is aimed at reducing IDF casualties and weakening Hamas by coming up with “alternative governance models.” But what good governance model can emerge from aligning with criminal clans?

Instead of boosting serious, reform-minded Palestinians — of which there are plenty — turning to thugs will only add to the chaos in Gaza. In turn, this will give Netanyahu’s far-right partners Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, both of whom were sanctioned by the U.K. this week, more opportunity to argue for Jewish settlements in Gaza — a move that would undoubtedly push back any chance of serious negotiations over a two-state solution. According to new U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, the two-state solution is no longer backed by the Trump administration.

Overall, the whole effort fits into the shopworn pattern of the past 70 years: Turning to a fox to distract from serious thinking about how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be brought to a peaceful conclusion.