The Turnberry trap: Trump, Europe and global reordering

Robert Benson is the associate director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress.

History will likely remember the U.S.–EU Turnberry trade deal less for its technicalities than for what it symbolizes: the moment Washington openly rewrote the transatlantic bargain.

Far from a victory for Brussels, this terse 19-point deal merely codified the structural disadvantages the bloc faced in earlier trade talks. Building on the understanding reached at U.S. President Trump’s Turnberry golf resort in July — which European leaders had called “a dark day” — the agreement imposed a 15 percent tariff on most European exports to the U.S. and formalizes a commitment to bring auto tariffs to the same level, while leaving the levies on Europe’s car industry punishingly high.

Yet, somehow, the release of the deal’s framework text was met with grudging acceptance — and even relief — on the grounds that it was the best bargain Europe could hope for. Essentially, what began as a trade standoff ended in a lopsided pact formalizing America’s leverage over Europe. Then, before the ink had even dried, Washington drew a new battle line, threatening fresh tariffs that would strike at the core of the bloc’s digital sovereignty.

This broadside exposes a deeper truth: Europe is adrift in a world where it no longer shapes the norm and stands increasingly vulnerable to American revisionism.

This realization may be frightening, but it shouldn’t come as a surprise. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had already laid out this vision last fall — that the U.S. must leverage Europe’s security dependence to rewrite the global economic order in its favor. Turnberry is simply the first full implementation of this strategy, and pressure will only mount from here.

The deal itself is structurally skewed, front-loading a 15-percent asymmetric tariff in favor of U.S. industries and shielding American sectors from reciprocal obligations. Its bold promises — including $750 billion in U.S. energy exports and $600 billion in EU investment — are also unrealistic and deliberately designed to collapse under their own weight. So, when the EU inevitably falls short, the U.S. can then seize the opportunity to press for greater concessions on tech regulation and digital services.

The real purpose isn’t compliance, it’s coercion. And while the fact that we’ve so far managed to avoid a full-blown trade war may appear to some as evidence of successful diplomacy, this reading overlooks the real cost of Brussels’s concessions: sharp economic contraction, political backlash and the normalization of bullying in international diplomacy.

Europe is navigating a maze of interdependencies, and Washington knows exactly how to exploit that. As evidenced by Congressman Jim Jordan’s August visits to Brussels, London and Dublin, MAGA will now frame the EU’s digital regulation — on content moderation, data privacy and platform accountability — as violations of “free speech” and anti-American bias. This is more than a rhetorical ploy, it’s a calculated effort to destabilize Europe’s liberal democracies by amplifying fringe political actors, sowing division and undermining trust in centrist institutions.

Beyond pushing back against tech standards, Washington is positioning itself to challenge Europe on the ideological legitimacy of its entire regulatory model. Thus, the battle over digital sovereignty will be cast in civilizational terms — free markets versus bureaucratic overreach, expression versus censorship, sovereignty versus globalism. And Europe’s far-right narrative of elite censorship will have the imprimatur of U.S. policy.

These grievances will then likely merge with U.S. demands for greater burden-sharing on defense or security concessions on Ukraine. It’s also entirely possible the Trump administration will exploit divisions among member countries on digital sovereignty, tying reviews of America’s force posture to regulatory rollbacks, a retreat on digital taxes or alignment with its own tech standards.

 Brussels needs to be prepared for the battles ahead. Thankfully, some of the consequences are already coming into focus:

First, driven by anemic growth forecasts of 0.5 to 0.9 percent — particularly in export-heavy economies like Germany — the risk of a far-right surge across Europe is growing. This economic pain will translate into political volatility. Populist parties will frame Brussels as complicit in Washington’s coercion and incapable of defending national interests. And despite its ideological affinities with the U.S., Europe’s far right won’t have any qualms with turning on its ideological bedfellows in the White House. Germany’s Alternative for Germany and France’s National Rally are already exploiting anger over the deal and are calling for a loosening of transatlantic ties. 

Next, when it comes to security, the U.S.–EU decoupling that’s already in motion will only accelerate. France and Germany are currently reviving proposals for a European Security Council, accelerating cooperation under Permanent Structured Cooperation and weighing investment in a European Defense Fund. Public opinion is shifting too. Majorities in Germany and France now support greater autonomy in defense planning and procurement, with pluralities favoring a European army. Even staunchly Atlanticist Poland is moving away from reflexive alignment with Washington.

Finally, there’s the fact that, sooner or later, markets will wake up to the implications of this global reordering. So far, they’ve largely shrugged it off, treating Turnberry as theater, and investors have priced in volatility without grasping the deeper structural shift underway. But if capital flows start reflecting the risk of permanent transatlantic divergence — on currency regimes, regulatory frameworks and trade access — the spiral could be swift. And unlike the 2008 financial crisis, the shock wouldn’t be easily sutured.

Europe isn’t powerless here. It retains economic scale, regulatory clout and unused tools — but it must be prepared to use them.

This means treating economic security like national security, and embedding defense autonomy, energy resilience and technological sovereignty into a unified strategic doctrine. It also means strengthening Europe’s defenses against asymmetric coercion. Brussels’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, a trade tool meant to counter economic blackmail by imposing targeted measures on U.S. service providers, was a step in the right direction — even if it ultimately wasn’t deployed. Now, the EU must also build legal firewalls against extraterritorial enforcement and deploy its regulatory power to actively shape global norms.

Europe’s challenge isn’t to restore the old transatlantic bargain but to build a new one before the next crisis hits and Trump dictates the terms once more. If the bloc hesitates, it won’t get to choose at all.